THE *GIFSTOL* CRUX IN *BEOWULF*

By R.E. KASKE

Early in *Beowulf*, a long account of Grendel's crimes in Heorot (100ff.) concludes with the famous lines,

> Swa fela fyrena feond mancynnes,
> atol angengea, oft gefremede,
> heardra hynða. Heorot eardode,
> sincfage sel sweartum nihtum;
> no he þone gifstol gretan moste,
> maþðum for metode, ne his myne wisse. (164-9)[1]

The final lines of this passage (168-9) may well be the most difficult single crux in the poem, and their component problems have often been itemized; a useful analysis is that of C.L. Wrenn:

> The ambiguities are: (1) does *hē* refer to Grendel or to Hrōþgār? (2) is the throne God's or Hrōþgār's? (3) does *grētan* mean 'approach' or 'attack' (both senses are well attested)? (4) does *māþðum* refer to the *gif-stōl* or is it used more loosely to mean 'precious gift' received by a loyal retainer? (5) does *for* mean "because of" (the Creator preventing the approach to or attack on the throne), or "in the presence of"? (6) Does *myne* mean "mind", "purpose" (so used in 2572) or "love" (strongly supported by the use of the identical phrase *mine (=myne) wisse* in *Wanderer* 27)?[2]

A relevant seventh question might concern the subject of *wisse* and the antecedent of *his* in line 169b.

We should begin by noticing that although these lines have inspired a small library of controversy,[3] they are not the sort of crux for which no credible solution has ever been proposed; on the contrary, several of the existing interpretations seem to me in themselves to be more or less plausible. For example, Friedrich Klaeber suggested long ago that the *gifstol* is "the divine throne of grace"; that *for metode* carries a meaning like "divine", "of the Creator", or "in the presence of the Creator"; that *ne his myne wisse* can be rendered, "nor did he (God) take thought of him"; and that the two lines are accordingly a statement of Grendel's inability to approach God's throne.[4] Robert M. Estrich, assembling a wealth of evidence for the sacral character of the king's throne in ancient Germania, translates lines 168-9, "he could not approach [or attack] the throne, the treasure, because of God: he did not

know God's love"; and William A. Chaney supports this interpretation with specific instances from Anglo-Saxon law, relating it also to the remarks in lines 154-8 about Grendel's unwillingness to pay *wergeld* for his murders.[5] Arthur G. Brodeur presents an elaborate argument for construing *he* in line 168a as a reference to Hroðgar, paraphrasing the meaning of our two lines, "*because* Grendel haunted Heorot every night, Hrothgar could not approach his own throne - on account of the Lord, whose love (or favor) Hrothgar did not know"; his explanation is supported by David Clipsham, who emphasizes the currency of this proposed cataphoric use of the pronoun in Old English.[6] Finally, Joseph L. Baird proposes that *metode* in line 169a refers to Hroðgar rather than to God; renders lines 166b-9, "He [Grendel] inhabited Heorot, the richly decorated hall in the dark nights; he [Grendel] might not at all approach the giftstool [throne], with treasures before [in the presence of] the ruler [i.e., of the giftstool or of Heorot; i.e. Hrothgar], nor know his [Hrothgar's] love"; and suggests that if the *gifstol* was the place where the ruler not only dispensed gifts but received them from his warriors, the point of our passage may be to characterize Grendel as the *angengea* (165) who refuses to settle the feud with gifts (154-8) - thus forming part of the ironic image of Grendel as outlawed *þegn* which pervades this part of the poem.[7] So far as I can see, each of these interpretations is persuasive in its own terms, and none includes a necessarily fatal weakness - so that no explanation which may be proposed for lines 168-9 can be supported by the simple but powerful argument that there is no credible alternative.[8] In this situation, almost any new solution, however attractive, seems doomed to take its place as one of several comparably plausible ones; the only exception would be a solution that clearly fitted one or more parts of the puzzle more convincingly than any of the rest, with no loss of credibility in its other parts. The following interpretation seems to me to fall at least into the former category; to what extent it satisfies the demanding and elusive criteria of the latter, the reader must decide.

I begin with the syntactically noncommittal half-line 169b, *ne his myne wisse*, which (depending partly on one's understanding of the rest of the passage) seems able to mean either that Grendel did not know God's mind, purpose, or love; that Grendel did not know Hroðgar's mind, purpose, or love; that God did not know Grendel's mind, purpose, or love; that God did not know Hroðgar's mind, purpose, or love; that Hroðgar did not know God's mind, purpose, or love; that Hroðgar did not know Grendel's mind, purpose, or love; that Hroðgar could not "make known his inclination to serve his people with gifts for the Lord", or could not "know his own mind";[9] that God did not take thought of Grendel (with *wisse* meaning "was conscious of");[10] or that Grendel did not care for, paid no attention to, had no pleasure in, could not work his will on, or could not comprehend Hroðgar's throne (with *his* construed as a genitive depending on *myne wisse* and referring to *gifstol* and/or *maþðum*).[11] Among this welter of possibilities, most can be related more or less plausibly to the situation; so far as I know, the only one that might suggest a more specific and imaginatively rewarding allusion is the apparently unpromising statement that God did not know

Grendel's mind.

I do not think it has ever been pointed out in connection with this passage that in the *Moralia in Iob* of Gregory the Great - that vast storehouse which provides so much of the stuff of medieval Christian imagery - an exposition of God's initial question to Satan, "Unde venis?" (Job i 7), analyzes at length how God can be said not to "know" the sinner and his ways:

> *Cui dixit Dominus: Vnde uenis?* Quid est quod uenientibus electis angelis nequaquam dicitur: Vnde uenitis? Satan uero unde ueniat percontatur? Non enim requirimus, nisi utique quae nescimus. Nescire autem Dei reprobare est. Vnde quibusdam in fine dicturus est: *Nescio uos unde sitis, discedite a me omnes operarii iniquitatis* [Luke xiii 27]. Sicut et nescire mentiri uir uerax dicitur qui labi per mendacium dedignatur; non quo si mentiri uelit nesciat, sed quo falsa loqui ueritatis amore contemnat. Quid est ergo ad satan *unde uenis* dicere, nisi uias illius quasi incognitas reprobare? Veritatis igitur lumen tenebras, quas reprobat ignorat; et satanae itinera, quia iudicans damnat, dignum est ut quasi nesciens requirat. Hinc est quod Adae peccanti conditoris uoce dicitur: *Vbi es*? [Gen. iii 9]. Neque enim diuina potentia nesciebat, post culpam seruus ad quae latibula fugerat? Sed quia uidit in culpa lapsum iam sub peccato uelut ab oculis ueritatis absconditum, quia tenebras erroris eius non approbat, quasi ubi sit peccator ignorat, eumque et uocat et requirit dicens: *Adam ubi es?* Per hoc quod uocat, signum dat quia ad paenitentiam reuocat. Per hoc quod requirit, aperte insinuat quia peccatores iure damnandos ignorat. Satan ergo Dominus non uocat sed tamen requirit dicens: *Vnde uenis?* quia nimirum Deus apostatam spiritum ad paenitentiam nequaquam reuocat, sed uias superbiae eius nesciens damnat.
> (*The Lord said to him, "Whence do you come?"* Why is it that when the good angels come the Lord does not say to them, "Whence do you come?" And why is Satan asked whence he comes? After all, we only ask about things of which we are ignorant. But for God "not to know" something is the same as for him to reproach someone. So at the last judgment it will be said to some, "I do not know you or whence you are; depart from me all you doers of iniquity" [Luke xiii 27]. Just as a truthful man is said not to know how to lie if he refuses to lapse into falsehood; it is not that he would not know how if he did wish to lie, but that he despises false-speaking for love of truth. What is it therefore to say to Satan, "Whence do you come?" if not to reproach his ways as ones unknown to God? The light of truth is ignorant of the shadows it loathes; and truth itself, as if out of ignorance, rightly asks after the paths of Satan that God condemns in judgment. This is why the voice of the creator says to the sinning Adam, "Where are you?" [Gen. iii 9]. The divine power was not unaware of the hiding places his servant had chosen in flight after his sin, but because God saw him lapsed into sin and still, as it were, hidden from the eyes of truth under sin, and because God did

not approve the shadows of his error, so (as if he did not know where the sinner was) he calls out to him and asks, "Adam, where are you?" By the fact that he calls, he gives a sign that he calls Adam back to repentance. By the fact that he asks, he hints openly that he knows nothing of sinners who are rightly to be damned. God does not call Satan, but only makes inquiry of him, saying: "Whence do you come?" God does not in any way invite the apostate spirit to repentance, but condemns him by ignoring the ways of his pride.)[12]

Parts of this passage are repeated by early redactors of the *Moralia*;[13] its final sentence also finds a parallel in a pseudo-Hieronymian *Expositio interlinearis libri Job*, supposedly extracted from a fifth-century commentary by Philip the Priest: "Non ignorantia Dei exprimitur, sed vias superbiae diaboli nesciens damnavit."[14]

Gregory's development of the same idea in his exposition of "ipse novit et decipientem, et eum qui decipitur" (Job xii 16) seems even more relevant for our purposes:

Cum omnis qui proximum suum decipere conatur iniquus sit, et iniquis Veritas dicat: *Numquam noui uos, discedite a me qui operamini iniquitatem* [Matt. vii 23], qualiter hoc in loco dicitur quia Dominus decipientem nouit? Sed quia scire Dei aliquando cognoscere dicitur, aliquando approbare; et scit iniquum quia cognoscendo iudicat - neque enim iniquum quempiam iudicasset si nequaquam cognosceret - et tamen iniquum nescit quia eius facta non approbat. Et nouit ergo quia deprehendit et non nouit quia hunc in suae sapientiae specie non recognoscit. Sicut de ueraci quolibet uiro dicitur quia falsitatem nesciat, non quia cum uel ab aliis falsum dicitur, hoc reprehendere ignorat, sed eamdem ipsam fallaciam et scit in examine et nescit in amore, ut uidelicet ipse hanc non agat quam actam ab aliis damnat.
(Since everyone who tries to deceive his neighbor is wicked, and Truth says to the wicked, "I have never known you; depart from me, you who work wickedness" [Matt. vii 23], how then is it said here that the Lord knows the deceiver? But God's "knowledge" sometimes stands for knowledge, sometimes for approval; and he both knows the wicked man, because by what he knows he judges - he would never have judged anyone to be wicked if he had not known him in some way - and at the same time he does not know the wicked man because he does not approve of his deeds. He knows, because he discovers wickedness; and he does not know, because he does not acknowledge in the wicked the pattern of his own wisdom. In the same way it is said of a truthful man that he does not know falsehood, not because when falsehood is uttered by others he does not know how to rebuke it, but because the same falsehood is both known to him through examination and not known through love, so that he himself may not do that which he condemns when done by others.)[15]

This emphatic declaration that God does not "know" the wicked would offer a poetically suggestive interpretation of our half-line *ne his myne wisse*, rendered straightforwardly as "nor did (God) know (Grendel's) mind *or* thought". Gregory's explanation that God does not "know" the wicked man *quia hunc in suae sapientiae specie non recognoscit* would relate thematically to Grendel's lack of wisdom, which I have commented on elsewhere;[16] while the final reference to the truthful man's not "knowing" falsehood *in amore* (clearly introduced as a parallel to God's not "knowing") might, I suppose, help explain the poet's choice of the word *myne*, apparently able to carry the meaning "love" as well as the more usual "mind" or "thought".[17]

The idea that God does not "know" the sinner seems closely related to the statement that God does not remember or pays no attention to either the man of ill-will or the devils or damned souls at the Last Judgment. Gregory himself, expounding Job xxiv 20, "non sit in recordatione", explains at length how the wicked man can be said not to come into God's remembrance.[18] The *Exeter Gnomes* (*Maxims I*) include the observation,

> Wærleas mon ond wonhydig,
> ætrenmod ond ungetreow,
> þæs ne gymeð god. (161-3)

Cynewulf's *Elene* describes the fate of the devils after the Judgment -

> Gode no syððan
> of ðam morðorhofe in gemynd cumað,
> wuldorcyninge . . . (1302-4)

- and *Crist III* assigns the same fate to both the devils and the souls of the damned: "Nales dryhtnes gemynd / siþþan gesecað . . ." (1536-7). A pseudo-Ambrosian and pseudo-Augustinian sermon on the Judgment says that the damned "non venient unquam in memoriam apud Deum".[19] In the Old High German *Muspilli* the damned soul "niist in kihuctin himiliskin gote".[20] The apparent popularity of this motif recalls inevitably Klaeber's early rendering of *ne his myne wisse* as "nor did he (God) take thought of him", in an interpretation which, though evidently abandoned by Klaeber himself, has never to the best of my knowledge been seriously discredited.[21] It may well be, then, that my interpretation of line 169b by way of Gregory's *Moralia*, with emphasis on God's not "knowing" the wicked, should be somehow modified by or combined with that of Klaeber, with emphasis on God's not deigning to remember them; however that may be, my analysis of the rest of the passage will be seen to coincide with Klaeber's to a great extent.

Though one would not care to press such an interpretation too insistently, it does seem to me to give the mysterious *ne his myne wisse* a point, allusive depth, and climactic strength that I have always found somewhat lacking in the previous ones. To whatever extent it can be taken seriously, it will of course help to establish the probabilities governing our interpretation of the preceding

lines. If, for example, line 169b is a reference to God's not "knowing" the sinner in the way I have proposed, with its inevitable suggestions about Grendel's spiritual state and God's indifference or hostility toward him, it might increase the likelihood that the *gifstol* is not Hroðgar's throne but God's throne of grace, as has seemed probable to an impressive series of scholars.[22] The word *gifstol* is of course used for the heavenly throne in Cynewulf's *Crist*, where after the Ascension Christ seeks it:

> Wile nu gesecan sawla nergend
> gæsta giefstol, godes agen bearn,
> æfter guðplegan. (571-3)

Accepting this view of the *gifstol*, I would construe *þone* in line 168a as an emphatic demonstrative, "*that* gift-throne". In line 169a, I construe *maþðum* as an appositive with *gifstol*, and follow Klaeber's early suggestion that *for metode* is to be rendered "in the presence of the Creator" or "of the Creator"[23] - somewhat like *for meotode* in line 83 of *Christ and Satan* (where it is a variation of *mid gode* in the preceding line) or *for drihtne* in line 3 of the *Rune Poem*. It can of course be pertinently asked how Grendel, "when leaving his watery haunts, and playing havoc in the hall, [could] be at all supposed to appear instead in Heaven, before *ȝæsta ȝiefstol* (*Crist* 572)!"[24] The answer, I suspect, is that *moste* in line 168b is to be understood as a preterite subjunctive (as apparently in *Beowulf* 2241),[25] emphasizing Grendel's total spiritual depravity by way of the typically ironic understatement, "he could not have approached that gift-throne". If these various conjectures can be entertained, lines 166b-69 may be paraphrased somewhat as follows: "Heorot he held, the treasure-adorned hall [including, of course, its gift-throne], in the dark nights; but never could he have approached that other gift-throne, that treasure before God - nor did God even know him". The pointed parallel and contrast between the treasure-adorned hall (with its gift-throne) which Grendel could possess, and the treasure of God's gift-throne which he could not, recall almost inevitably the famous comparison between earthly and heavenly treasure in Matthew vi 19-20. It has been objected that except for the instance in *Crist* 572 quoted above, all the occurrences of the word *gifstol* in Old English (including that in *Beowulf* 2327) refer unambiguously to earthly thrones; that in *Crist* "it is the presence of the qualifying *gæsta* which allows *gifstol* to bear an added theological significance"; and that it is therefore unlikely that the *gifstol* of *Beowulf* 168 could bear such a significance.[26] In my rendering, however, a comparable qualification would be provided by *þone gifstol . . . maþðum for metode*: "that gift-throne . . . (that) treasure before God".

To whatever extent this interpretation has been convincing, lines 168-9 seem to fall into place as a devastating pronouncement on Grendel, climaxing the description of his outrages in lines 100-69; and more specifically, as one of a series of pointed comments analyzing his spiritual state: *ond no mearn fore, / wæs to fæst on þam* (136-7); *godes yrre bær* (711); *dreamum bedæled* (721).

Perhaps the very word *gifstol* and its inevitable connotations of an earthly gift-throne, inviting as they do a comparison between the heavenly throne and the one in Heorot, serve ultimately as a focal connection between these recurrent spiritual condemnations of Grendel and the whole ironic treatment of him as a kind of *healðegn manqué* (142)[27] - with his hopeless alienation from the heavenly *gifstol* (epitomized in lines 168-9) mockingly parodied by an equally hopeless alienation from any worthy relation to the earthly throne of Hroðgar.

NOTES

[1] Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie, ed., *Beowulf and Judith*, The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records 4 (New York, 1953) pp.7-8. All further references to OE poetry will be to the ASPR by line-numbers.

[2] Ed., *Beowulf* (London, 1953) pp.188-9; repeated unchanged in the revision by W.F. Bolton (New York, 1973) p.104.

[3] Guides to the previous scholarship, partly complementary, are provided by Dobbie, ed., *Beowulf and Judith*, pp.125-6; Donald K. Fry, *Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburh: A Bibliography* (Charlottesville, Va., 1969) p.215, "168ff"; Douglas D. Short, *Beowulf Scholarship: An Annotated Bibliography*, Garland Reference Library of the Humanities 193 (New York, 1980) p.349, "*gifstol*"; and Stanley B. Greenfield and Fred C. Robinson, *A Bibliography of Publications on Old English Literature to the End of 1972* (Toronto, 1980) pp.92-5 and 164-89, *passim*.

[4] "Textual Notes on the *Beowulf*", *JEGP* 8 (1909) pp.254-5. Klaeber evidently had many second thoughts about this proposal; see his "Beowulfiana", *Anglia* 50 (1926) pp.113-14, "A Few *Beowulf* Jottings", *Beiblatt zur Anglia* 50 (1939) p.330, and his edition, *Beowulf* (3rd ed., Boston, 1950) pp.135, 453, 465.

[5] Estrich, "The Throne of Hrothgar - *Beowulf*, 11.168-169", *JEGP* 43 (1944) pp.384-9; Chaney, "Grendel and the *Gifstol*: A Legal View of the Monsters", *PMLA* 77 (1962) pp.513-20.

[6] Brodeur, *The Art of Beowulf* (Berkeley, Calif., 1959) pp.200-4; Clipsham, "*Beowulf* 168-169", in *In Geardagum*, ed. Loren C. Gruber and Dean Loganbill ([Denver, Colo.], 1974) pp.19-24.

[7] "'for metode': *Beowulf* 169", *ES* 49 (1968) pp.418-23.

[8] For the opposite situation, in which the absence of a plausible alternative is itself a major argument, see my article "The Conclusion of the Old English 'Descent into Hell'", in *Paradosis: Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain* (New York, 1976) pp.47-59.

[9] Suggested by Arthur E. DuBois, "*Gifstol*", *MLN* 69 (1954) pp.546-9.

[10] See Klaeber, "Textual Notes", pp.254-5 (at note 4 above). This rendering is adopted by John R. Clark Hall, trans., *Beowulf*, rev. C.L. Wrenn and J.R.R. Tolkien (London, 1950) p.28.

[11] Such constructions are proposed by Peter J. Cosijn, *Aanteekeningen op den 'Beowulf'* (Leiden, 1891-92) p.5; Eduard Sievers, "Zum *Beowulf*", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 29 (1904) p.319 (following A. Holtzmann); Ernst A. Kock, *Jubilee Jaunts and Jottings*, Lunds Universitets Årsskrift N.S. 1, 14, no.26 (Lund, 1918) p.8; S.J. Crawford, "*Beowulf*, 11.168-9", *MLR* 23 (1928) p.336; Johannes Hoops, *Kommentar zum Beowulf* (Heidelberg, 1932) pp.38-9; Norman E. Eliason, "Beowulf Notes", *Anglia* 71 (1953) pp.441-2; and G. Storms, "Notes on Old English Poetry", *Neophilologus* 61 (1977) pp.439-40.

[12] II, v, 6, ed. M. Adriaen, *S. Gregorii Magni Moralia in Iob libri I-X*, CCSL 143 (Turnhout, 1979) pp.62-3 (PL 75.557-8). Here and at note 15 below, I am grateful to James J. O'Donnell for providing me with the relevant passages from his translation of the *Moralia*, to appear in the

series "The Fathers of the Church".

13 In the late sixth or early seventh century by Paterius, *Liber testimoniorum*, I, 21 (PL 79.692); in the seventh by Taio of Saragossa, *Sententiae*, I, 24 (PL 80.755), and the Irish scholar Lathcen, *Egloga*, II, 13-18, ed. M. Adriaen, CCSL 145 (Turnhout, 1969) p.12; and in the early tenth by Odo of Cluny, *Epitome Moralium S. Gregorii in Iob*, II (PL 133.116).

14 PL 23.1409, also commenting on Job i 7. On the relation of this *Expositio* to Philip's still unprinted commentary, see Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi* (Madrid, 1950ff.) II, p.189, #1664, and IV, p.438, #6970; and E. Dekkers and A. Gaar, *Clavis Patrum Latinorum*, Sacris Erudiri 3 (2nd ed., Bruges, 1961) p.149, #643 and pp.171-2, #757.

15 XI, xii, 18, ed. Adriaen, *S. Gregorii Magni Moralia in Iob libri XI-XXII*, CCSL 143-A (Turnhout, 1979) p.596 (PL 75.962). Parts of this passage are repeated by Lathcen, *Egloga*, XI, 102-5 (p.113); and Odo, *Epitome*, XI (PL 133.222). Note also *Moralia*, XXIII, i, 7, on Job xxxviii 2 (PL 76.254-5); and Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* on Ps. i 6, ed. E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont, CCSL 38 (Turnhout, 1956) p.3. Broadly similar explanations are common in exegesis of Matt. vii 23 and Luke xiii 25.

16 "*Sapientia et Fortitudo* as the Controlling Theme of *Beowulf*", *SP* (1958) pp.438-9; and "*Beowulf*", in *Critical Approaches to Six Major English Works: Beowulf through Paradise Lost*, ed. R.M. Lumiansky and Herschel Baker (Philadelphia, 1968) pp.18-19.

17 Joseph Bosworth and T. Northcote Toller, *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* (Oxford, 1882-98) p.703; and C.W.M. Grein, *Sprachschatz der angelsächsischen Dichter*, ed. J.J. Köhler (Heidelberg, 1912) p.487.

18 *Moralia*, XVII, ii, 2 (CCSL 143-A, pp.850-1; PL 76.10-11).

19 Pseudo-Ambrosian sermon 24, i (PL 17.652); pseudo-Augustinian sermon 251 (PL 39.2210). On the frequent attribution of this sermon to Caesarius of Arles, see G. Morin, ed., *Caesarii Arelatensis opera*, I, 2, CCSL 104 (Turnhout, 1953) p.978.

20 Line 29, ed. Elias von Steinmeyer, *Die kleineren althochdeutschen Sprachdenkmäler*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1963) p.67. Most of the foregoing examples are noted by Albert S. Cook, ed., *The Christ of Cynewulf* (Boston, 1900) p.217, and/or Friedrich Klaeber, "Die christlichen Elemente im *Beowulf*, II", *Anglia* 35 (1911) p.254.

21 See above at notes 4 and 10.

22 Karl Körner, review of *Beowulf* trans. L. Botkine, *Englische Studien* 2 (1879) p.249; C.W.M. Grein, quoted by Richard Paul Wülcker, ed., *Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Poesie* (Kassel, 1883) I, ii, 155, note to line 168; Bernhard ten Brink, *Beowulf: Untersuchungen* (Strassburg, 1888) p.20; Oliver F. Emerson, "Legends of Cain, especially in Old and Middle English", *PMLA* 21 (1906) p.863; temporarily Klaeber, "Textual Notes", p.254; W.J. Sedgefield, ed., *Beowulf* (3rd ed., Manchester, 1935) p.107; Marie Padgett Hamilton, "The Religious Principle in *Beowulf*", *PMLA* 61 (1946) p.321; Wrenn, ed., *Beowulf*, p.189; Eliason, "*Beowulf* Notes", p.442; and (allegorically) Margaret E. Goldsmith, *The Mode and Meaning of Beowulf* (London, 1970) p.109.

23 "Textual Notes", p.254. See Bosworth and Toller, *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*,

p.301; and especially Grein, *Sprachschatz*, p.208 (*for*, #2).

[24] Kock, *Jubilee Jaunts*, p.7.

[25] For other examples see Grein, *Sprachschatz*, p.482.

[26] John Golden, "A Typological Approach to the *Gifstol* of *Beowulf* 168", *NM* 77 (1976) pp.194-5.

[27] See for example Edward B. Irving, Jr., *A Reading of Beowulf* (New Haven, 1968) pp.16-20, 96; and Baird, "'for metode'", p.423.